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ABSTRACT
Corruption is believed to be a major factor impeding economic development, but the importance of
legal  enforcement  versus  cultural  norms  in  controlling  corruption  is  poorly  understood.  To
disentangle these two factors, we exploit a natural experiment, the stationing of thousands of
diplomats from around the world in New York City. Diplomatic immunity means there was
essentially zero legal enforcement of diplomatic parking violations, allowing us to examine the role
of cultural norms alone. This generates a revealed preference measure of government officials'
corruption based on real-world behavior taking place in the same setting. We find strong persistence
in corruption norms: diplomats from high corruption countries (based on existing survey-based
indices) have significantly more parking violations, and these differences persist over time. In a
second main result, officials from countries that survey evidence indicates have less favorable
popular  views  of  the  United  States  commit  significantly  more  parking  violations,  providing
non-laboratory evidence on sentiment in economic decision-making. Taken together, factors other
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The underlying causes of corruption remain poorly understood and widely debated. Yet the study of 
corruption beyond the realm of opinion surveys is still in its infancy, and there is little firm evidence 
relating corruption to real-world causal factors. Notably, social norms are often mentioned as a primary 
contributor to corruption in both the academic literature and the popular press, yet there is no evidence 
beyond the most casual of cross-country empirics.
1 
Research on the causes of corruption is compounded by the difficulties inherent in disentangling 
the effect of social norms versus legal enforcement: societies that collectively place less importance on 
rooting out corruption, and thus have weak anti-corruption social norms, may simultaneously have less 
legal enforcement. Understanding the relative importance of these potential causes of corruption is of 
central importance in reforming public institutions to improve governance: if corruption is predominantly 
controlled through anti-corruption social norms, interventions that focus exclusively on boosting legal 
enforcement will likely fail. 
  We develop an empirical approach for evaluating the role of social norms in corruption by 
studying parking violations among international diplomats living in New York City. Consular personnel 
and their families benefit from diplomatic immunity, a privilege which allowed them to avoid paying 
parking fines prior to November 2002. We examine differences in the behavior of government employees 
from different countries, all living and working in the same city, all of whom can act with impunity in 
(illegally) parking their cars. The act of parking illegally fits well with a standard definition of corruption, 
i.e., “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain,”
2 suggesting that the comparison of parking violations 
by diplomats from different societies serves as a plausible measure of the extent of corruption social 
norms or a corruption “culture”. 
                                                 
1 See Lambsdorff (2005) for an overview of findings on culture and corruption based on cross-country comparisons. 
Witzel (2005) provides one of many discussions on the topic in the popular press. Mauro (2004) discusses several 
models of multiple equilibria in corruption levels that could be seen as capturing corruption culture. Tirole (1996) 
develops a model of bureaucratic collective reputation that also implies persistent corruption. 
2 This is the definition used by the international anti-corruption organization Transparency International (see 
http://ww1.transparency.org/about_ti/mission.html, accessed online March 9, 2006).   1 
This setting has a number of advantages. Most importantly, our approach avoids the problem of 
differential legal enforcement levels across countries, and more generally strips out enforcement effects, 
since there was essentially no enforcement of parking violations for diplomats during the main study 
period. We thus interpret diplomats’ behavior as reflecting their underlying propensity to break rules for 
private gain when enforcement is not a consideration. Additionally, because U.N. diplomats are largely 
co-located in Midtown Manhattan, we avoid many concerns of unobserved differences in parking 
availability across geographic settings. 
The first contribution of this approach lies in allowing us to construct a “revealed preference” 
measure of corruption for government officials across 146 countries. This objective measure, based on 
real rule-breaking in parking, is arguably an improvement over existing country corruption indices that 
are typically based on subjective surveys, and it is certainly much cheaper data to collect.
3 Other existing 
corruption measures are also difficult to interpret – what does moving from a score of “1” to a score of 
“2” on a cross-country index really mean? – while our parking violations measure has a much more 
precise definition and explicitly cardinal interpretation. 
In our main empirical result, we find that this parking violation corruption measure is strongly 
positively correlated with other country corruption measures, and that this relationship is robust to 
conditioning on region fixed effects, country income, and a wide range of other controls (including 
government employee salary measures). This finding arguably validates the usefulness of the new 
measure. It also goes against the predictions of standard economic models of crime in situations of zero 
legal enforcement (e.g., Becker 1968). These would predict that parking violations should be high across 
the board for all diplomats when enforcement is lifted. Instead we find that diplomats from low corruption 
countries (e.g., Norway) behave remarkably well even in situations where they can get away with 
violations, while those from high corruption countries (e.g., Nigeria) commit many violations, suggesting 
that they bring the social norms or corruption culture of their home country with them to New York City. 
                                                 
3 In this sense, our corruption measure is conceptually similar to the Economist magazine’s “Big Mac Index” as a 
measure of country purchasing power parity.   2 
An alternative explanation for this pattern warrants mentioning upfront. It is possible there are 
stronger social sanctions – for example, public embarrassment through the media upon returning home – 
in low corruption countries against diplomats who commit many parking violations while in New York, 
relative to diplomats from high corruption countries. If the potential response of others in the home 
country, either informally or formally, is responsible for limiting parking violations, then diplomats’ 
behaviors are better interpreted as an indication of their home country’s cultural tolerance for corruption 
rather than their own personal values. However, this is still consistent with our basic interpretation of the 
level of New York City parking violations as a revealed preference measure of country corruption norms. 
The parking violations data exist at the individual diplomat level for all U.N. mission diplomats 
present in New York City (numbering over 1700 at any given point in time), allowing us to study how 
individual behavior evolves over time in a situation of zero enforcement. For diplomats from high 
corruption countries of origin, a model of convergence to United States corruption norms would 
(presumably) predict a decline in the rate of parking violations over time, as tenure in the U.S. increases. 
By contrast, a model of convergence to the “zero enforcement” norm discussed above would imply an 
increase in violations over time, particularly for officials from low corruption countries. We do find 
evidence that the frequency of violations increases with tenure in New York City. However, in contrast to 
both models of norm convergence, there is a statistically significant positive interaction effect of home-
country corruption levels and tenure in New York City, implying much greater increases in violations 
over time among diplomats from the high corruption countries. 
The parking violation dataset also provides a novel window into the related issues of sentiment 
and affinity in individual decision-making. It is often claimed that sentiment has a major impact on 
important economic decisions as suggested, for example, by the frequent use of consumer boycotts to 
pressure corporate policies and the “capitalization of patriotism” in low yield war bonds. However, the   3 
empirical evidence on this score remains contested.
4 We find that diplomats from countries where popular 
attitudes towards the United States tend to be unfavorable (based on comparable cross-country survey 
data) have significantly more parking violations than those from countries where attitudes towards the 
United States are largely positive. This setting is one in which diplomats can indulge their personal tastes 
for rule-breaking without punishment, and it appears that diplomats from countries where the U.S. is 
unpopular derive positive utility from breaking U.S. rules (or suffer less disutility than other diplomats 
from doing so). 
A final empirical finding is worth highlighting. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
attacks, there was a sharp – though temporary – drop in diplomatic parking violations, by roughly 80%. 
We find that countries with greater proportions of Muslim population experience particularly sharp 
declines. We can only speculate about the exact causes of this change in behavior, but the fear of police 
harassment or negative media attention for their home country during that politically delicate period is a 
possibility. Also recall that there were hundreds of attacks on Muslims in the United States in the weeks 
following the 9/11 attacks (Council on American-Islamic Relations 2002). 
  The main theoretical implication of these empirical patterns, taken together, is that culture, 
norms, and emotions – in other words, factors other than legal enforcement – play a key role in 
government officials’ corruption decisions. They suggest that understanding these factors should be taken 
seriously in debates about the causes of corruption and the policy measures to combat it. 
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the diplomatic parking situation in 
New York City and the violations data, section 3 discusses the rest of the dataset, section 4 contains the 
empirical results and the final section concludes. 
 
2. Diplomatic Parking Violations in New York City 
                                                 
4 There is a small but growing literature on consumer sentiment and purchasing behavior. Chavis and Leslie (2006) 
examine the effect of the Iraq War on French wine sales and find mixed results. In the domain of corporate social 
responsibility, Hiscox and Smyth (2006) find that “good labor” labels have a strong impact on consumer demand.    4 
Diplomatic immunity provides consular officials and their families with protection from prosecution or 
lawsuits in their host country. The original intent of these laws was to protect diplomats from 
mistreatment abroad, especially in countries not on friendly terms with the home country.
5 However, 
these days diplomatic immunity is more commonly viewed as the “best free parking pass in town” (BBC 
1998). Diplomatic vehicles possess license plates tagged with the letter “D” that signals diplomatic 
status.
6 While these vehicles may be ticketed, the car’s registrant is shielded from any punishment for 
non-payment of the ticket. Thus one immediate implication of diplomatic immunity – not just in New 
York, but also in most other capitals (e.g., London (BBC 1998), Paris (Agence Presse-France 2005), 
Seoul (Korea Times 1999)) – has been that it allows diplomats to park illegally but never suffer any threat 
of legal punishment, leaving a “paper trail” of illegal acts with no consequences.
7 To illustrate the 
magnitude of the problem, between November 1997 and the end of 2002 in New York City, diplomats 
accumulated over 150,000 unpaid parking tickets, resulting in outstanding fines of more than $18 million. 
The parking violations data are at the level of the individual unpaid violation.
8  Drivers have 30 
days to pay a ticket before it goes into default, at which point an additional penalty is levied (generally 
110% of the initial fine). Diplomats then receive an additional 70 days to pay the ticket plus this penalty 
before it is recorded in our dataset as an unpaid violation in default. The information on each violation 
includes the license plate number, the name and country of origin of the car’s registrant, the date, time 
and location of the violation, the fine and penalty levied, and amount paid (if any). The most common 
diplomatic parking violation was parking in a “No Standing – Loading Zone” (43% of violations). The 
remainder were spread across a wide range of violation types that imply varying degrees of social harm
9: 
fines for expired meters accounted for 6% of the total, double-parking for 5%, and parking in front of a 
                                                 
5 While the origins of diplomatic protection date back many centuries, the current incarnation is found in the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.  See http://www.un.int/usa/host_dip.htm for the full text. 
6 Note that while the vehicle’s diplomatic status is revealed by the license plate, there is nothing that identifies the 
country of origin of the vehicle’s registrant. 
7 See http://www.state.gov/m/ds/immunities/c9127.htm. 
8 We gratefully acknowledge the New York City Department of Finance, in particular Sam Miller and Gerald 
Koszner, for compiling these data. 
9 Almost all parking violations in the dataset resulted in fines of US$55, making it impossible to assess the extent of 
social damage by violations’ relative prices.   5 
fire hydrant 7%, for instance. We present analyses for different types of violations below. Also note that 
in 20% of violations the registrant is the mission itself, signifying an official rather than personal vehicle. 
We return to this below in describing our individual-level results. The period of coverage is November 
24, 1997 to November 21, 2005. (Refer to the Data Appendix for a more detailed description of the New 
York City parking violations dataset.) 
  A crucial change in legal enforcement took place in October 2002, with the implementation of the 
Clinton-Schumer Amendment (named after the two senators from New York State), proposed by the 
Bloomberg administration to deal with the diplomat parking problem. This law gave the City permission 
to tow diplomatic vehicles, revoke their official U.N. parking permits, and have 110% of the total amount 
due deducted from U.S. government aid to the offending diplomats’ countries of origin (Singleton 2004). 
Parking violations fell substantially after this reform, suggesting that increased enforcement can sharply 
reduce corruption, but the basic cross-country patterns remain unchanged, as we discuss below. 
We thus mainly focus on the pre-reform period, November 1997 through October 2002, since it is 
closest to the zero legal enforcement environment we are interested in. For most of the analysis we 
employ the total amount of unpaid parking violations for a particular country’s diplomats conditional on 
the total number of U.N. permanent mission staff with diplomatic privileges. We obtain staff information 
from the U.N. Bluebook for May 1998. Published twice annually, the Bluebook lists all U.N. mission 
staff, as well as their official titles. We additionally use U.N. Bluebooks for 1996–2002 to track the U.N. 
tenure of individual level violators. Fortunately, the Bluebooks use consistent spellings across editions, 
facilitating automated matching across time. In a majority of cases, the spelling and format were also 
consistent with the names in the parking violations data; the algorithm automatically matched 71% of 
diplomats in the violations database (see the Data Appendix for further details). The first Bluebook we 
use is from February 1996, and we use this as our start date for calculating tenure at the United Nations. 
That is, we cannot distinguish among arrival times pre-1996, and all individuals included in the February 
1996 Bluebook are coded as arriving in that month. As a robustness check, we also limit the sample only   6 
to diplomats who were not yet present in New York in the 1996 Blue Book (reducing the sample by 
16%), which allows us to more accurately capture arrival dates, as discussed below. 
We also obtained data on the number of diplomatic license plates registered to each mission from 
the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Foreign Missions, and we use this data as a control variable in 
some specifications. Unfortunately, these data are only available for 2006, though we were assured that 
these numbers are largely stable over time.
10 
Table 1 presents the annual number of violations per diplomat during November 1997 – October 
2002 period by country, along with the total number of diplomats from the May 1998 U.N. Bluebook. 
Overall, the basic pattern accords reasonably well with common perceptions of corruption across 
countries. The worst parking violators – the ten worst are Kuwait, Egypt, Chad, Sudan, Bulgaria, 
Mozambique, Albania, Angola, Senegal, and Pakistan – all rank poorly in cross-country corruption 
rankings. While many of the countries with zero violations accord well with intuition (e.g., the 
Scandinavian countries, Canada), there are a number of surprises. Some of these are countries with very 
small missions (e.g., Burkina Faso and the Central African Republic), and a few others have high rates of 
parking violations but do pay the fines (these are Bahrain, Malaysia, Oman, and Turkey; we return to this 
issue below). The smallest missions may plausibly have fewer violations since each mission is given two 
legal parking spaces at the United Nations and this may suffice if the country has very few diplomats. 
Figure 1 plots the total violations per month during November 1997 – November 2005. There are 
two clear declines in the number of violations – the first comes in September 2001, corresponding to the 
period following the World Trade Center attack. The second and more pronounced decline coincides with 
increased enforcement in New York City. 
 
3. Cross-country data 
We also employ country-level data on economic, political, and social characteristics, and in particular 
consider data on country corruption levels, using the corruption measure in Kaufmann et al (2005) from 
                                                 
10 We thank Murray Smith of the U.S. Office of Foreign Services for these data and for many useful conversations.   7 
1998, the earliest year with wide country coverage. This is a composite corruption index that is essentially 
the first principal component of a number of other commonly used corruption indices. By definition, 
therefore, it is quite highly correlated with the commonly used indices and is extremely highly correlated 
(￿=0.97) with the Transparency International (TI) ratings from the same year. For ease of interpretation, 
we reverse the sign of the original measure so that higher values indicate greater corruption. The mean 
value of this measure is zero, and it ranges from -2.6 to +1.6 in our sample of countries. The main 
advantages of this country measure are that its method of aggregation is clearly defined relative to the TI 
measure, and it has broader country coverage than other indices. 
The Pew Global Attitudes Survey
11 from 2002 (the earliest year that the survey was performed) 
provides a measure of anti-American sentiment based on responses to the question: “Please tell me if you 
have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the 
United States.” This is coded to take on values from one (most favorable) to four (least favorable) and 
then averaged across respondents. To control for general aversion to foreigners, we similarly code 
responses to another question from the Pew survey that asks respondents their attitudes towards a 
dominant regional country (for example, Argentines are asked to give their opinion of Brazil). The five 
countries in the Pew dataset whose citizens viewed the U.S. most favorably in 2002 are Honduras, 
Venezuela, Ghana, Philippines, and Nigeria, while the five that viewed the U.S. least favorably are Egypt, 
Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. The preponderance of Middle Eastern countries may in part be 
due to popular opposition there to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which was imminent by late 2002. 
Unfortunately, the Pew data are not available prior to 2002 and thus we are unable to explore whether 
changes in popular attitudes over time affect New York City parking violations. 
We include a number of other variables that may affect incentives to comply with local laws. 
From the data of Kuziemko and Werker (2006), we generate an indicator variable denoting whether the 
country received foreign aid from the United States in 1998. We similarly generate a pair of indicator 
variables for military and economic aid, respectively, since these two types of aid may reflect different 
                                                 
11 These data are publicly available online at http://pewglobal.org/ (accessed March 9, 2006).   8 
geopolitical interests: while economic aid recipients may feel beholden to the United States, those 
receiving military aid are typically countries that the United States requires as strategic allies. 
Finally, we consider whether unpaid violations appear to be driven by an income effect. We 
include the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1998 in U.S. dollars taken from the World Development 
Indicators in most specifications. Country-level income per capita is strongly correlated with corruption 
and with the rule of law, and may be caused in part by underlying corruption levels, complicating efforts 
to disentangle corruption effects from income effects. As we discuss below, despite this strong correlation 
the main corruption results are robust to including a linear income control. Second, we include the ratio of 
government bureaucrats’ salaries to GDP per capita (using data from Schiavo-Campo et al 1999) for the 
early 1990s (exact year differs by country) to account for the possibility bureaucrats occupy different 
positions in the national income distribution. 
Our sample consists of all countries that had 1998 populations greater than 500,000 according to 
the World Development Indicators, and for which basic country-level data were available. Table 2 
presents summary statistics for both the country-level and diplomat-level variables. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The main econometric specification in the cross-country analysis is presented in equation 1: 
log(1+Average annual unpaid parking violations)i 
= a + b1log(Diplomats)i + b2Corruptioni + Xi¢g + ei   (1) 
where i denotes the country, Corruption is the 1998 country corruption index, and X is a vector of other 
country controls, including region fixed effects, the log of GDP per capita in 1998, among others 
depending on the specification, and e is a standard white noise disturbance term. 
  The New York City unpaid parking violations measure is robustly positively correlated with the 
existing country corruption index conditional on the number of U.N. mission diplomats for that country in 
New York City (Table 3, regression 1). The relationship is roughly linear (Figure 2). The coefficient   9 
estimate on the country corruption index is robust to the inclusion of log per capita income (regression 2) 
and also to the log of the number of vehicles registered to each mission as a control (regression 3),
12 
though the point estimate drops by nearly half using the income control. The result is also robust to 
controlling for the average government wage relative to per capita income (regression 4) and to region 
fixed effects (regression 5). The regions with the greatest average number of unpaid parking violations 
relative to the reference region (North America and the Caribbean) are Africa and the Middle East. Note 
that while the coefficient on corruption is robustly significantly significant across these specifications, the 
coefficient on country per capita income is sensitive to the choice of sample and covariates. 
  The strong relationship between the parking violation corruption measure and the country 
corruption index also holds if the dependent variable is log(1 + Average annual unpaid parking violations 
/ Diplomats) across specifications (Table 4), is robust to specifications where log(Diplomats) is included 
as an additional control (results not shown), and similarly holds if a tobit specification is used rather than 
OLS (Appendix Table A1). 
We obtained similar data on parking violations by embassy diplomats in London as a further 
robustness check. This information is reported annually in the minutes of the U.K. House of Lords, as is 
information on the number of diplomats from each country residing in London. We use data for the years 
1998-2002 to best match the New York City analysis. The London data is coarser than the New York City 
data in several ways. First,, only country violation totals are reported (rather than the detailed micro-data 
available for New York City), and countries with fewer than ten violations are not reported. Further, the 
fact that foreign embassies are scattered throughout London further complicates the interpretation relative 
to New York City where U.N. missions are co-located in Midtown Manhattan and thus diplomats face a 
similar parking environment. Despite these differences, the results imply a relationship between country 
corruption and diplomatic parking violations in London that is remarkably similar to the estimated effects 
for U.N. diplomats in New York. In regressions analogous to Table 3 but using London parking violations 
                                                 
12 A specification using fixed effects for the number of vehicles per mission generates similar results (results not 
shown). Further, these estimated fixed effects are uniformly increasing in the number of vehicles, implying a 
monotonic relationship consistent with the linear functional form we report in the table.   10 
as the dependent variable, the coefficient estimate on the country corruption index takes on values ranging 
between 0.38 and 0.70, and these effects are statistically significant at over 90% confidence across all 
OLS and tobit specifications (results not shown). 
The coefficient estimate on the country corruption measure in the New York City data remains 
positive and large (0.3) but loses statistical significance if quadratic and cubic polynomials for the log of 
country per capita income are included controls, in part because standard errors increase (regression not 
shown). However, the implied relationship between country per capita income and parking violations is 
non-monotonic: it rises up through (roughly) average per capita income in the sample, before declining. 
This pattern argues strongly against the explanation that richer countries are simply able to purchase more 
parking spots for their diplomats, in which case we would expect a monotonic negative relationship 
between country income and parking violations. We prefer to focus on the specification with a linear log 
per capita income control since doing so most directly addresses theoretically well-motivated concerns 
about such monotonic income effects, rather than including additional highly collinear income controls.
13 
Since we can follow individual diplomats during their tenure at the U.N., we examine the related 
question of whether there is any evolution of diplomat behavior while in New York City. Conceptually, 
the relative plausibility of socialization to U.S. norms versus convergence to a uniform high corruption 
norm is unclear. If convergence is to U.S. corruption norms, individuals from high corruption countries 
should have declining parking violations over time, but there be should be no change in behavior for 
diplomats from the low corruption societies. Alternatively, individuals may begin their stay in NYC 
unsure as to the extent they can get away with parking violations. Once they successfully “get away with 
it” a few times (or hear stories about others getting away with it) and learn about the reality of zero 
enforcement, diplomats may become bolder in their violations.  Thus convergence to this “zero 
enforcement” norm predicts increasing parking violations over time, particularly among diplomats from 
low corruption countries. In practice to estimate these effects we use a regression equation of the form: 
                                                 
13 The strong empirical relationship between country corruption and income may theoretically reflect causal impacts 
in both directions (poorer countries become more corrupt, or corrupt countries become poorer), and this complicates 
the interpretation of regressions where both terms are included as controls.   11 
log (1 + Monthly unpaid parking violations)ijt 
= at + b1log(Months in NYC)ijt + b2{log(Months in NYC)ijt*Corruptioni} + Xijt¢g + eijt  (2) 
where i again denotes a country and j denotes an individual diplomat from that country in month t, Xijt is a 
vector of individual diplomat characteristics, and the final term is the error, which is allowed to be 
correlated across monthly observations for the same individual. We include month fixed effects (at) in all 
specifications, and also sometimes include diplomat fixed effects (aij). The two key terms in this analysis 
are b1, the effect of increased time spent working as a consular official in New York City on parking 
violations for diplomats from countries with a corruption index of zero (corresponding to average 
corruption in the sample), and b2, the differential time effect for diplomats from countries with higher 
corruption. 
  The frequency of unpaid violations increases rapidly and statistically significantly with tenure in 
New York City (Table 5, regression 1). On average parking violations increase by 8-18% with a doubling 
of the length of tenure in New York City. This result is robust to the inclusion of diplomat fixed effects 
(regression 2), and to the use of a discrete measure of violations (regressions 4 and 5).  In contrast to 
models of convergence to U.S. corruption norms, we do not find a negative interaction effect of home-
country corruption levels and tenure in New York. Rather the coefficient estimate on this interaction term 
is positive and statistically significant, implying that there is a divergence in the rate of violations over 
time, with diplomats from high corruption countries showing increasingly more violations relative to 
diplomats from low corruption countries over time, perhaps as they learn about the reality of diplomatic 
immunity. However, the point estimates indicate that even diplomats from very low corruption countries 
(those with corruption index scores below -2, say) show some smaller increases in violations over time. 
Finally, we note that the results are virtually identical if we repeat the analysis dropping individuals that 
arrived only after the earliest U.N. Bluebook was published (results not shown), which allows us to more 
accurately capture date of arrival but reduces the sample. An additional robustness check based on a split 
of the sample by country average parking violations also generated similar results (results not shown).   12 
  Various measures of proximity to the U.S. are correlated with fewer unpaid parking violations. 
First, the log of the weighted average distance between a country’s population and the U.S. population is 
strongly positively correlated with parking violations, even conditional on world region fixed effects 
(Table 6, regression 1), indicating that diplomats from countries physically closer to the U.S. have many 
fewer New York City violations. The exact reasons for this pattern are elusive, but greater trade, 
migration, and tourism between the countries are possible explanations.
14 
The Pew dataset provides a measure of popular attitudes towards the U.S. in a subset of 42 
countries, and here we find that diplomats from countries in which popular attitudes are unfavorable are 
significantly more likely to have unpaid parking violations (Table 6, regression 2). The estimated effect is 
large: a one standard deviation increase in the extent of unfavorable views leads to a more than doubling 
of parking tickets. One possible explanation for this result, which would lead to a spurious correlation, is 
that individuals in countries that hold negative views about other countries in general also tend to be 
corrupt. However, the result remains robust when we include an additional attitude control that reflects 
responses to a parallel question on respondents’ dislike of a neighboring country (regression 3). The 
coefficient estimate on this additional control is near zero and not statistically significant while the 
coefficient estimate on views towards the U.S. remains nearly unchanged and statistically significant at 
over 90% confidence. The main limitation of the analysis in regressions 2 and 3 is the small sample size 
of only 42 countries
15, the countries for which there is Pew survey data. In contrast, the association 
between the proportion of Muslim population in a country, which is widely thought to be related to anti-
American popular attitudes, is not significantly related to unpaid parking violations (regression 5) whether 
or not region fixed effects are included as controls (results not shown). 
The relationship between unpaid New York City parking violations and the country corruption 
index remains qualitatively similar, but becomes somewhat weaker, during the post-enforcement period 
                                                 
14 Trade with the United States is indeed negatively correlated with diplomats’ parking violations, but this effect 
loses statistical significant when we control for geographic distance to the U.S. (results not shown), suggesting there 
are other factors beyond trade alone. 
15 This decline in sample size is responsible for the loss of statistical significance for the coefficient estimate on 
Corruption, which nonetheless remains nearly identical in magnitude to the other specifications.   13 
after November 2002 (Table 7, regressions 1 and 2). This is in part because overall levels of parking 
violations fell dramatically (Figure 1). The same is true for the Pew measure of unfavorable attitudes 
towards the U.S. (regression 3), which remains positively and statistically significantly correlated with 
parking violations. Finally, we note that countries that had higher levels of U.S. economic aid show sharp 
drops in parking violations after November 2002 (regression 4), although the point estimate on the aid 
coefficient was similarly negative even in the pre-enforcement period. Thus it does not appear that the 
new policy of linking U.S. foreign aid to unpaid parking tickets appears was an important component of 
the decline in violations. 
  Figure 1 indicates that there was a sharp drop in violations in the months following the September 
11
th, 2001 attacks in New York City, and we find that countries with larger proportions of Muslim 
population experience particularly pronounced declines. This finding holds in a specification containing 
country and month fixed effects (regression 1), when additional country-specific time trends are included 
(regression 2), and with an income control (regression 3). Potential explanations for this result included 
the possibility that governments in predominantly Muslim countries exerted greater pressure on their 
diplomats to limit violations in order to avoid arousing local ire in New York City, or alternatively that 
Muslim diplomats may themselves have wished to be unobtrusive given the surge of anti-Muslim feeling 
and violence in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. One further potential explanation – that missions from 
predominantly Muslim countries withdrew diplomats for safety reasons – can be ruled out: the U.N. 
Bluebook shows no post-9/11 decline in the number of diplomats from predominantly Muslim countries 
posted in New York (regression not shown). 
 
Further Robustness Checks and Alternative Explanations 
As noted in the introduction, informal or formal social sanction against diplomats in the home country 
could be partially responsible for restraining parking violations in some cases. In such cases, diplomats’ 
behaviors are better interpreted as an indication of their home country’s norms or culture rather than their 
own personal values. We acknowledge this possibility but note that this account remains consistent with   14 
our interpretation of the level of New York City parking violations as a revealed preference measure of 
corruption for government officials from a certain country, in the absence of formal legal enforcement. 
Nonetheless, two findings argue against this alternative interpretation as the main driver of our 
findings. First, a Lexis-Nexis search of 504 European news outlets (English language or in translation) 
using the terms DIPLOMATS and PARKING and NEW YORK yielded only 25 stories during the entire 
study period, and these stories were concentrated in just four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, 
France, and Russia). Further, with the exception of several Russian articles, the stories were about the 
general problem of diplomatic parking violations in New York City and the 2002 crackdown, rather than 
reporting on the behavior of home country diplomats. The possibility of sanctions for returning diplomats 
who accumulated parking tickets while abroad is apparently not a leading media issue, in Europe at least. 
Second, we considered whether unpaid parking violations early in an official’s tenure at the 
United Nations in New York City is correlated with the length of his employment there, and further 
whether these early violations interact in any way with corruption in the country of origin (i.e., perhaps 
violators from low corruption countries could be punished by their government and sent home early). We 
find no evidence for any such effects of parking violations on diplomat tenure (regressions not shown). 
Obviously, neither of these two findings is completely conclusive. In equilibrium the number of 
violations committed will reflect choices made, in part, to avoid home country sanctions. But they are 
certainly consistent with the view that home country enforcement was typically weak or nonexistent. 
  An additional estimation concern is that our country corruption measure may be picking up an 
income effect rather than a corruption effect. Wealthier diplomats could potentially have greater means to 
simply pay off any tickets or use parking garages, for example. However, this also seems unlikely. First, 
the inclusion of paid violations in our parking violations measure has no effect on the main results 
(Appendix Table A2). We also find that the index of country corruption explains unpaid parking 
violations even conditional on a linear national per capita income control (and also controlling for the 
ratio of bureaucratic wages to per capita income), although our results are attenuated somewhat by the 
inclusion of higher order polynomial income controls, as discussed above.   15 
Finally, we examined the predictors of the most socially egregious New York City parking 
violations, the rationale being that relatively impoverished diplomats from poor countries might be forced 
to park illegally in order to avoid the extra expense of renting a parking spot, but might still try to do so in 
a manner that avoids excessive negative social externalities. As indications of extreme violations, we in 
particular consider parking in front of a fire hydrant, and violations for double-parking on East-West 
streets between 10
th and 100
th Streets in Manhattan. These are relatively narrow and heavily traveled 
roads and double parking will often completely block passage. The main results hold robustly for both 
types of violations (Appendix Table A3); in other words, diplomats from high corruption countries are 
much more likely to commit the most egregious parking violations. Hence our results are not driven 
solely by behaviors causing minimal social harm (i.e., an expired meter in a legal parking spot). Once 
again, we acknowledge that these tests cannot conclusively rule out that income is playing some role in 
driving the country corruption result, but the weight of the evidence argues against this explanation. 
  A final consideration is whether there is a differential selection mechanism for U.N. diplomats 
across countries that might account for the pattern we observe. In particular, it would problematic if the 
relatively more corrupt government officials (within the distribution of officials in a country) were 
selected for New York postings from high corruption countries. We have no rigorous statistical test to 
explore this possibility, but we feel it is unlikely to be of first-order importance for several reasons. First, 
U.N. mission staff are selected along a range of common characteristics, including English-language 
skills, education and diplomatic experience, and this reduces the gap between diplomats in terms of their 
personal attributes. Further, we are not concerned with differential selection of “corrupt” types into the 
government bureaucracy versus the private sector across countries, since we are interested in the behavior 
of actual government civil servants, like the U.N. mission diplomats we observe. So any selection story 
must pertain to selection across branches of the civil service. To the extent that this selection effect is at 
work, we might expect it to operate in the opposite direction. For example, in the Transparency 
International 2005 survey of the bureaucracy in Kenya – a reasonably high corruption country –   16 
diplomatic missions were rated as the fifth least corrupt among all 34 government ministries.
16 It appears 
that, if anything, U.N. postings offer fewer opportunities for graft than many other government positions 
(e.g., in customs) and thus might likely attract the relatively less corrupt bureaucrats in high corruption 
countries. This would dampen the observed correlation between parking violations and home-country 
corruption rather than generating a spurious positive correlation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We exploit a unique natural experiment – the stationing in New York City of thousands of government 
officials from 146 countries around the world – in a setting of zero legal enforcement of parking 
violations to construct a revealed preference measure of official corruption. We find that this measure is 
strongly correlated with existing measures of home country corruption. This finding suggests that cultural 
or social norms related to corruption are quite persistent: even when stationed thousands of miles away, 
diplomats behave in a manner highly reminiscent of officials in the home country. Norms related to 
corruption are apparently deeply engrained, and factors other than legal enforcement are important 
determinants of corruption behavior. 
The related second empirical finding is the strong negative relationship between affinity for the 
United States in the diplomat’s home country and parking violations in New York. This provides real-
world empirical evidence that sentiments matter in economic decision-making in general and for 
corruption decisions in particular. One implication of this finding is that government officials’ “feelings” 
towards their own nation – for instance, their extent of patriotism, national pride, or strength of national 
identity – could also be factors in their corruption decision within the home country. 
One important message from our empirical results is that corruption norms are sticky. This result 
raises the critical question of whether there are policy interventions that can modify corruption norms 
                                                 
16 This report may be found at http://ww1.transparency.org/surveys/dnld/kenya_bribery_index2005.pdf, accessed 
May 5, 2006. Transparency International reports on corruption across branches of government for other countries 
can be found at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/asia_pacific, although to our 
knowledge only in the case of Kenya do they explicitly rank diplomats relative to other branches of government.   17 
over time. For example, the Bloomberg administration’s enforcement efforts in New York City in 2002 
were extremely successful in changing diplomats’ behaviors, and it would be useful to know whether 
these changes might additionally have had persistent effects on norms once individuals become 
habituated to rule compliant behavior. Such long-run effects of temporary interventions necessarily rely 
on a shift in norms (or tastes), and would be consistent with the findings of Di Tella and Schargrodsky 
(2003) on the persistent effects of auditing on corruption in Argentina. Unfortunately, our context does 
not accommodate this analysis. 
Finally, our methodology of inexpensively generating cross-country data could potentially be 
applied to other settings where comparable individuals from across countries are present in the same place 
for a period of concentrated activity (the Olympics Games, for example). In this spirit, in separate work 
we are preparing to study the economic decisions of taxi drivers waiting to pick up passengers at John F. 
Kennedy International Airport in New York City. This subject pool similarly provides us with a vast 
population of thousands of individuals drawn from societies throughout the world. We hope that this, and 
other variants on the methodology, will be useful in informing our understanding of how cultural and 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Average Unpaid Annual New York City Parking Violations per Diplomat, 11/1997 to 11/2002 
 
Corruption 




diplomats in 1998  Country code 
1  KUWAIT  246.2  9  KWT 
2  EGYPT  139.6  24  EGY 
3  CHAD  124.3  2  TCD 
4  SUDAN  119.1  7  SDN 
5  BULGARIA  117.5  6  BGR 
6  MOZAMBIQUE  110.7  5  MOZ 
7  ALBANIA  84.5  3  ALB 
8  ANGOLA  81.7  9  AGO 
9  SENEGAL  79.2  11  SEN 
10  PAKISTAN  69.4  13  PAK 
11  IVORY COAST  67.1  10  CIV 
12  ZAMBIA  60.4  9  ZMB 
13  MOROCCO  60.0  17  MAR 
14  ETHIOPIA  59.7  10  ETH 
15  NIGERIA  58.6  25  NGA 
16  SYRIA  52.7  12  SYR 
17  BENIN  49.8  8  BEN 
18  ZIMBABWE  45.6  14  ZWE 
19  CAMEROON  43.6  8  CMR 
20  MONTENEGRO & SERBIA  38.0  6  YUG 
21  BAHRAIN  37.7  7  BHR 
22  BURUNDI  37.7  3  BDI 
23  MALI  37.4  5  MLI 
24  INDONESIA  36.1  25  IDN 
25  GUINEA  34.8  5  GNB 
26  SOUTH AFRICA  34.0  19  ZAF 
27  SAUDI ARABIA  33.8  12  SAU 
28  BANGLADESH  33.0  8  BGD 
29  BRAZIL  29.9  33  BRA 
30  SIERRA LEONE  25.6  4  SLE 
31  ALGERIA  25.2  13  DZA 
32  THAILAND  24.5  13  THA 
33  KAZAKHSTAN  21.1  9  KAZ 
34  MAURITIUS  20.5  4  MUS 
35  NIGER  19.9  3  NER 
36  CZECH REPUBLIC  18.9  7  CZE 
37  LESOTHO  18.8  6  LSO 
38  BOTSWANA  18.5  8  BWA 
39  BHUTAN  18.4  5  BTN 
40  SRI LANKA  17.2  5  LKA 
41  CHILE  16.5  14  CHL 
42  TUNISIA  16.5  11  TUN 
43  NEPAL  16.5  6  NPL   20 
44  IRAN  15.7  20  IRN 
45  FIJI  15.5  3  FJI 
46  ITALY  14.6  16  ITA 
47  LIBERIA  13.5  6  LBR 
48  MALAWI  13.0  6  MWI 
49  PARAGUAY  13.0  6  PRY 
50  RWANDA  12.9  3  RWA 
51  UKRAINE  12.9  14  UKR 
52  SPAIN  12.7  15  ESP 
53  PHILIPPINES  11.5  20  PHL 
54  GHANA  11.3  10  GHA 
55  MAURITANIA  11.2  5  MRT 
56  GUINEA BISSAU  10.8  10  GIN 
57  ESTONIA  10.5  3  EST 
58  MONGOLIA  10.2  5  MNG 
59  ARMENIA  10.1  4  ARM 
60  COSTA RICA  10.1  19  CRI 
61  COMOROS  9.9  3  COM 
62  TOGO  9.9  5  TGO 
63  VIETNAM  9.8  15  VNM 
64  GEORGIA  9.7  8  GEO 
65  CHINA (PRC)  9.5  69  CHN 
66  YEMEN  9.1  8  YEM 
67  VENEZUELA  9.1  16  VEN 
68  PORTUGAL  8.8  16  PRT 
69  UZBEKISTAN  8.8  5  UZB 
70  MADAGASCAR  8.7  8  MDG 
71  TANZANIA  8.3  8  TZA 
72  LIBYA  8.2  9  LBY 
73  KENYA  7.7  17  KEN 
74  CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)  7.7  6  COG 
75  CROATIA  6.5  9  HRV 
76  DJIBOUTI  6.5  3  DJI 
77  SLOVAK REPUBLIC  6.4  12  SVK 
78  FRANCE  6.1  29  FRA 
79  INDIA  6.1  18  IND 
80  LAOS  6.1  9  LAO 
81  TURKMENISTAN  5.8  4  TKM 
82  PAPUA NEW GUINEA  5.5  3  PNG 
83  HONDURAS  5.4  6  HND 
84  SLOVENIA  5.2  8  SVN 
85  KYRGYZSTAN  5.2  5  KGZ 
86  NICARAGUA  4.9  9  NIC 
87  URUGUAY  4.4  11  URY 
88  SWAZILAND  4.3  7  SWZ 
89  TAJIKISTAN  4.3  4  TJK 
90  NAMIBIA  4.2  11  NAM 
91  MEXICO  4.0  19  MEX 
92  ARGENTINA  3.9  19  ARG 
93  SINGAPORE  3.5  6  SGP   21 
94  ROMANIA  3.5  10  ROM 
95  UGANDA  3.5  7  UGA 
96  HUNGARY  3.3  8  HUN 
97  MACEDONIA  3.3  4  MKD 
98  BOLIVIA  3.1  9  BOL 
99  PERU  3.1  9  PER 
100  HAITI  3.0  9  HTI 
101  JORDAN  2.9  9  JOR 
102  BELARUS  2.7  8  BLR 
103  BELGIUM  2.7  14  BEL 
104  CYPRUS  2.5  11  CYP 
105  GUYANA  2.3  5  GUY 
106  AUSTRIA  2.2  21  AUT 
107  GABON  2.2  8  GAB 
108  RUSSIA  2.0  86  RUS 
109  LITHUANIA  2.0  7  LTU 
110  EL SALVADOR  1.7  10  SLV 
111  POLAND  1.7  17  POL 
112  GAMBIA  1.5  8  GMB 
113  MALAYSIA  1.4  13  MYS 
114  TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO  1.4  6  TTO 
115  LEBANON  1.3  3  LBN 
116  GERMANY  1.0  52  DEU 
117  ERITREA  0.8  3  ERI 
118  MOLDOVA  0.7  4  MDA 
119  KOREA (SOUTH)  0.4  33  KOR 
120  DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  0.1  22  DOM 
121  FINLAND  0.1  18  FIN 
122  GUATEMALA  0.1  9  GTM 
123  NEW ZEALAND  0.1  8  NZL 
124  SWITZERLAND  0.1  10  CHE 
125  UNITED KINGDOM  0.0  31  GBR 
126  NETHERLANDS  0.0  17  NLD 
127  UNTED ARAB EMIRATES  0.0  3  UAE 
128  AUSTALIA  0.0  12  AUS 
129  AZERBAIJAN  0.0  5  AZE 
130  BURKINA FASO  0.0  5  BFA 
131  CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC  0.0  3  CAF 
132  CANADA  0.0  24  CAN 
133  COLOMBIA  0.0  16  COL 
134  DENMARK  0.0  17  DNK 
135  ECUADOR  0.0  9  ECU 
136  GREECE  0.0  21  GRC 
137  IRELAND  0.0  10  IRL 
138  ISRAEL  0.0  15  ISR 
139  JAMAICA  0.0  9  JAM 
140  JAPAN  0.0  47  JPN 
141  LATVIA  0.0  5  LVA 
142  NORWAY  0.0  12  NOR 
143  OMAN  0.0  5  OMN   22 
144  PANAMA  0.0  8  PAN 
145  SWEDEN  0.0  19  SWE 
146  TURKEY  0.0  25  TUR   23 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Observations 
Panel A: Country-level data       
Annual unpaid New York City parking violations per diplomat, 11/1997-11/2002 
a  2.06  1.41  146 
Annual unpaid and paid New York City parking violations per diplomat, 11/1997-11/2002 
a  0.28  0.35  146 
Annual unpaid New York City parking violations per diplomat, 11/2002-12/2005 
a  1.88  1.85  146 
log(Diplomats in the country U.N. Mission, 1998) 
b  2.21  0.69  146 
log(1+Number of license plates registered to the country’s U.N. Mission, 2006)
c  1.97  0.90  146 
Country corruption index, 1998 
d  -0.01  1.01  146 
log(Per capita income, 1998 US$) 
e  7.39  1.58  146 
Average government wage / Country per capita income, early 1990s
f  2.83  2.38  92 
log(Weighted distance between populations) 
g  9.11  0.42  146 
Proportion Muslim population, 2004 
h  0.28  0.37  146 
Unfavorable views towards the United States 
i  2.23  0.49  42 
Unfavorable views towards other countries 
i  2.25  0.51  42 
Received U.S. economic aid, 1998 
j  0.69  0.47  144 
Received U.S. military aid, 1998 
j  0.63  0.48  144 
       
Panel B: Diplomat-level data       
Monthly New York City parking violations, 11/1997-11/2002 
a  0.32  0.65  14408 
Length of time at the U.N. Mission in New York City (in months) 
b  24.98  16.07  14408 
       
 
Sources: 
a New York City, Parking Violations Database (provided to the authors by the New York City Department of Finance in December 2005). 
b United Nations Bluebook 1998. 
c U.S. Department of State Office of Foreign Missions (provided to the authors by Deputy Director Murray Smith in April 2006). 
d Composite index from Kaufmann et al. (2005), but here higher values indicate more corruption. 
e World Development Indicators (2005). 
f Schiavo-Campo et al. (1999); exact year differs by country. 
g Mayer and Zignago (2005) 
h US Department of State (2004)  
i Pew Global Attitudes Survey 2002. 
j Data from Kuziemko and Werker (2006).   24 
 




log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
log(Diplomats)  0.86***  1.04***  0.56  1.28***  1.12*** 
  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.36)  (0.31)  (0.26) 
Country corruption index, 1998  1.04***  0.56**  0.62**  0.92***  0.72*** 
  (0.15)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.33)  (0.25) 
log(Per capita income, 1998 US$)    -0.42**  -0.36**  -0.19  -0.23 
    (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.25)  (0.19) 
log(1 + Diplomatic Vehicles)      0.54**     
      (0.26)     
Average government wage / country per capita income        0.03   
        (0.11)   
Africa region indicator variable          2.92*** 
          (0.67) 
Asia region indicator variable          2.23*** 
          (0.72) 
Europe region indicator variable          2.30*** 
          (0.66) 
Latin America region indicator variable          1.60** 
          (0.77) 
Middle East region indicator variable          2.83*** 
          (0.89) 
Oceania region indicator variable          1.99** 
          (0.91) 
Observations  146  146  146  92  146 
R
2  0.23  0.26  0.26  0.33  0.34 
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)  3.8 (2.1)  3.8 (2.1)  3.8 (2.1)  3.8 (2.2)  3.8 (2.1) 
 
Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. 
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log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations/Diplomat) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Country corruption index, 1998  0.61***  0.27*  0.49**  0.38** 
  (0.08)  (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.17) 
log(Per capita income, 1998 US$)    -0.27**  -0.08  -0.11 
    (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.13) 
Average government wage / country per capita income      0.05   
      (0.08)   
Region indicator variables  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  146  146  92  146 
R
2  0.19  0.22  0.25  0.32 
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)  2.1 (1.4)  2.1 (1.4)  2.0 (1.4)  2.1 (1.4) 
 




Table 5: Unpaid Parking Violations over Time for Diplomats, 11/1997 to 11/2002 (pre-enforcement) 
 
  Dependent variable: 
  log(1 + Monthly NYC Parking Violations) 
Any Monthly NYC 
Parking Violation 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Log(Length of time in New York City (in months))  0.083***  0.185***  0.185***  0.147***  0.146*** 
  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Log(Length of time in New York City) * Country corruption index, 1998      0.030**    0.026*** 
      (0.014)    (0.008) 
Month Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Diplomat Fixed Effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  14408  14408  14408  14408  14408 
R
2  0.03  0.44  0.45  0.32  0.32 
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)  0.32 (0.65)  0.32 (0.65)  0.32 (0.65)  0.32 (0.65)  0.32 (0.65) 
 
Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors with clustering by diplomat. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) 
confidence. Observations are at the diplomat-month level. 
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log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
log(Diplomats)  1.15***  0.46  0.41  1.11***  1.13*** 
  (0.25)  (0.51)  (0.53)  (0.27)  (0.26) 
Country corruption index, 1998  0.72***  0.72  0.83  0.70***  0.71*** 
  (0.24)  (0.52)  (0.56)  (0.25)  (0.25) 
log(Per capita income, 1998 US$)  -0.24  -0.46  -0.42  -0.32  -0.23 
  (0.19)  (0.35)  (0.36)  (0.22)  (0.19) 
log(Weighted distance of population from U.S.)  1.65***         
  (0.58)         
Unfavorable views towards the U.S. (Pew)    2.55**  2.28*     
    (1.14)  (1.27)     
Unfavorable views towards other countries (Pew)      0.57     
      (0.66)     
Received U.S. economic aid        -0.70   
        (0.52)   
Received U.S. military aid        0.56   
        (0.35)   
Proportion Muslim population          0.20 
          (0.47) 
Region indicator variables  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  146  42  42  144  146 
R
2  0.37  0.47  0.48  0.35  0.34 
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)  3.8 (2.1)  4.4 (2.1)  4.4 (2.1)  3.8 (2.1)  3.8 (2.1) 
 
Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. 
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log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
log(Diplomats)  0.42***  0.52***  0.24  0.53*** 
  (0.11)  (0.12)  (0.29)  (0.13) 
Country corruption index, 1998  0.30***  0.33***  0.41  0.40*** 
  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.31)  (0.12) 
log(Per capita income, 1998 US$)    0.04  0.01  -0.05 
    (0.09)  (0.20)  (0.10) 
Unfavorable views towards the U.S. (Pew)      1.29***   
      (0.40)   
Received U.S. economic aid        -0.53** 
        (0.23) 
Received U.S. military aid        0.08 
        (0.17) 
Region indicator variables  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  146  146  42  144 
R
2  0.14  0.24  0.34  0.27 
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)  1.1 (0.9)  1.1 (0.9)  1.3 (0.9)  1.1 (0.9) 
 
Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence.    29 
 




log(1 + Monthly NYC Parking Violations) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Post 9/11 * Proportion Muslim population  -0.32**  -0.48**  -0.32** 
  (0.15)  (0.19)  (0.16) 
Post 9/11 * log(Per capita income, 1998 US$)      -0.007 
      (0.053) 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Month Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country-specific time trends  No  Yes  No 
Observations  7493  7493  7493 
R
2   0.78  0.82  0.78 
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)  2.7 (1.7)  2.7 (1.7)  2.7 (1.7) 
 
Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors with clustering by country. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) 
confidence. Observations are at the country-month level, for the period December, 1997 – November, 2002.   30 
 
Appendix Table A1: Country Characteristics and Unpaid New York City Parking Violations (in logs), 11/1997 to 11/2002 (pre-enforcement) 




log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
log(Diplomats)  0.89***  1.11***  1.35***  1.17*** 
  (0.27)  (0.28)  (0.35)  (0.27) 
Country corruption index, 1998  1.19***  0.63**  1.05**  0.83*** 
  (0.19)  (0.29)  (0.40)  (0.30) 
log(Per capita income, 1998 US$)    -0.48**  -0.22  -0.27 
    (0.20)  (0.31)  (0.22) 
Average government wage / country per capita income      0.01   
      (0.11)   
Region indicator variables  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  146  146  92  146 
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)  3.8 (2.1)  3.8 (2.1)  3.8 (2.2)  3.8 (2.1) 
 
Notes: Tobit specifications. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence. 
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log (1 + Annual NYC Parking Violations) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
log(Diplomats)  1.00***  1.12***  1.38***  1.19*** 
  (0.21)  (0.21)  (0.28)  (0.22) 
Country corruption index, 1998  0.96***  0.62***  1.14***  0.73*** 
  (0.15)  (0.22)  (0.31)  (0.23) 
log(Per capita income, 1998 US$)    -0.29**  0.05  -0.14 
    (0.15)  (0.24)  (0.17) 
Average government wage / country per capita income      0.15**   
      (0.07)   
Region indicator variables  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  146  146  92  146 
R
2  0.27  0.29  0.45  0.41 
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)  4.1 (1.8)  4.1 (1.8)  4.2 (1.9)  4.1 (1.8) 
 
Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence.  
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log (1 + Annual Cross-town Double-parking) 
Dependent variable: 
log (1 + Annual Fire Hydrant Violations) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
log(Diplomats)  0.48***  0.55***  0.68***  0.62***  0.74***  0.85***  0.94***  0.92*** 
  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.22)  (0.17) 
Country corruption index, 1998  0.43***  0.24*  0.40**  0.30*  0.62***  0.30**  0.50**  0.42** 
  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.18)  (0.15)  (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.21)  (0.18) 
log(Per capita income, 1998 US$)    -0.17*  -0.09  -0.11    -0.27**  -0.15  -0.20 
    (0.09)  (0.15)  (0.11)    (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.13) 
Average government wage / country per capita income      0.03        0.01   
      (0.06)        (0.06)   
Region indicator variables  No  No  No  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
Observations  146  146  92  146  146  146  92  146 
R
2  0.14  0.16  0.22  0.27  0.23  0.26  0.32  0.34 
Mean of dependent variable (s.d.)  1.1 (1.2)  1.1 (1.2)  1.1 (1.2)  1.1 (1.2)  1.7 (1.4)  1.7 (1.4)  1.7 (1.4)  1.7 (1.4) 
 
Notes: OLS regressions, White robust standard errors. Statistically significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***) confidence.    33 
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-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
Country corruption measure
NYC Violations/Diplomat (logs) Fitted values
 
Notes: Country abbreviations are presented in Table 1. The line is the quadratic regression fit. The y-axis is log(1+Annual NYC parking violations / Diplomat). 
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Data Appendix 
(1) New York City Diplomatic Parking Violation Data 
The New York City Department of Finance supplied listings of all unpaid parking violations of U.N. 
Missions. The violations covered the period from November 24, 1997 to November 21, 2005.  In order to 
appear in the database, a violation had to go unpaid for at least 100 days. Data were at the level of the 
violation, and included the following entries for each violation: 
·  Summons: unique identification number for the violation 
·  License plate number of the violating car 
·  The person to whom the violating car was registered, often the mission itself 
·  Time of violation: included both hour and minute as well as calendar date 
·  Type of violation, e.g. “FIRE HYDRANT” or “EXPIRED METER” 
·  Street address of violation 
·  Initial dollar value of fine issued  
·  Additional dollar penalty for having not paid the fine on time  
·  Amount paid towards the fine, generally zero 
·  Name of country to which the car is registered 
 
Data on U.N. diplomats’ paid parking violations (violations that did not go into arrears) were made 
available to us in aggregate form by the New York City Department of Finance. For each country, we 
were given statistics for the pre-enforcement period of November 24, 1997 – October 31, 2002 and the 
post-enforcement period of November 1, 2002 – November 21, 2005. 
(2) Country Corruption Index  
We use the aggregate measure of Kaufmann et al (2005) for the year 1998. Data are available at: 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html#dataset 
(3) World Region Classification 
United Nations region code data, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm, was 
used to classify countries into the following regions: (1) North America (including Carribbean), (2) South 
America, (3) Europe, (4) Asia, (5) Oceania, (6) Africa, (7) Middle East. The Middle East was defined as: 
Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.  
(4) International Trade Data 
Trade data (utilized only in unreported regressions) are taken from http://dataweb.usitc.gov/ 
(5) Geographic Distance From U.S. 
Distance from the United States is taken from Mayer and Zignago (2005). Their measure uses city-level 
data to assess the geographic distribution of population inside each nation. The idea is to calculate 
distance between two countries based on bilateral distances between the largest cities of those two 
countries, those inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s 
population. In practice, nearly identical results are obtained using the distance of countries’ capitals from 
Washington, D.C. 
(6) United Nations Bluebooks 
The United Nations issues its list of mission personnel, or Bluebook, twice yearly. We utilize edition 
numbers 280 (May 1998) through 288 (August 2002). Documents were retrieved from the UN Official 
Document System (ODS), available at http://documents.un.org/advance.asp. Searching for the symbol   36 
ST/SG/SER.A/### with truncation turned off returns the relevant Blue Book (where ### is the Blue Book 
edition number). 
(7) Mission Staff Counts 
Edition 280 (May 1998) was checked by hand to count the mission staff and spouses for each country in 
the Blue Book, producing the following variables. 
·  Mission: Indicator variable indicating whether the country had a U.N. mission  
·  Staff: Simple count of staff. Staff members are always listed with their surnames in bold  
(8) Longitudinal Staff Data 
Bluebook edition numbers 278 through 288 were converted into plain text format. A name-matching 
program then checked these text files against a list of names extracted from the NYC parking violations 
data. Names were converted to regular expressions to improve match quality (since names from parking 
violation data often used forward slashes in place of apostrophes and dashes). A name was considered to 
have matched (and thus to have been present at the date of the Bluebook’s publication) if its first name 
and last name appeared on the same line in the Bluebook. If a name matched more one time in the same 
Blue Book, its matches were checked by hand. The matching program also recorded the country of the 
mission in which the match was found. This country was checked against the country as specified by the 
parking violation data to verify match accuracy.  Finally, in a small number of cases (20 diplomats), we 
found that there were gaps in the individual’s appearance in the Blue Book, even though in some cases 
parking violations in vehicles registered to these individuals took place during the purported absence. We 
omit these few observations from our analyses, but in practice their inclusion does not affect the results 
(not shown). 
(9) Diplomatic Vehicles 
Data were provided by Murray Smith, Deputy Director at the U.S. State Department’s Office of Foreign 
Missions in April 2006. These data report counts of the number of vehicles with diplomatic license plates 
registered to each mission in early 2006. 
(10) Muslim Population 
 Data were taken from the religious demography sections of the U.S. State Department' s 2004 
International Religious Freedom Report,  available online at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/ 
(11) US Military/Economic Foreign Aid Data 
These data were provided to us by Iliana Kuziemko and Eric Werker. We utilize data on aid flows from 
1998. See Kuziemko and Werker (2006) for details.  
(12) London Parking Violations Data 
Unpaid parking violations of embassy diplomats in London are reported annually in the House of 
Commons Hansard Written Notes, for all embassies with more than ten violations in the preceding year. 
We use data from 1998-2002 to best match our U.N. parking violations data. Data may be obtained by 
searching the parliamentary records for diplomatic parking violations at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/cgi-bin/semaphoreserver?DB=semukparl&FILE=search  
(13) London Embassy Diplomatic Staff Counts 
Data were obtained for 1998 from the London Diplomatic List, which is published annually and records 
all the representatives of foreign states and Commonwealth countries in London. It is compiled by the 
British Foreign & Commonwealth Office. Information on ordering  is available at http://www.fco.gov.uk. 